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Abstract 
In this study, we investigate morality in relation to the public good in post-socialist Europe. Public good 
morality is deﬁ ned as the (non)acceptance of behaviour that contravenes the law and harms society and 
the greater good of the collective, such as cheating on taxes if one has the chance, paying cash to avoid 
taxes, not paying one’s fare in public transport, and claiming state beneﬁ ts one is not entitled to. Using 
data from the European Values Study in 2008 on more than 30,000 respondents in 23 post-socialist states, 
we ﬁ nd that on average the level of public good morality is quite high: 8.4 on a ten-point scale. However, 
there are marked diﬀ erences between individuals and between countries, which we attempt to explain 
by looking at the legacy of communist rule, processes of democratization and compliance attitudes. We 
ﬁ nd that individuals living in former Soviet states are more ‘lenient’ when it comes to actions that harm 
the collective. However, those who lived under communist rule for a longer time display higher (and 
not lower) levels of public good morality. The level of democracy in a country does not seem to add any 
explanatory power, but individuals who hold more democratic values appear to be morally less strict. 
Finally, compliance attitudes such as interpersonal trust and conﬁ dence in government do not seem to 
mediate the observed relationships between communist rule and democracy on the one hand and public 
good morality on the other hand.
Keywords: morality, public good, communist rule, democracy, comparative research.
Introduction
A growing body of literature draws attention to the potential discrepancy between what citizens 
socially accept or justify and what is deﬁ ned as legal by the state (see Van Schendel & Abraham, 
2005). On the one hand, socially unaccepted behaviour may be lawful, and on the other hand illegal 
actions may be viewed as acceptable by the public. Both lead to a potential conﬂ ict between the 
public and the state, and the latter is highly tangible when studying the concept of ‘public good’ 
morality, which can be deﬁ ned as the (non)acceptance of behaviour that contravenes the law and 
harms society or the greater good of the collective. The public good is usually deﬁ ned as common or 
collective beneﬁ ts provided by the government, such as basic services (e.g., national defence, police 
protection, and the system of law), but also the provision of education, health care, public transport, 
and so on. These collective beneﬁ ts are characterized by the infeasibility to withhold these beneﬁ ts 
from citizens once they are provided (Olson, 1971). This means that even those who do not pay for 
these collective beneﬁ ts cannot be excluded, which may lead to free-rider behaviour. This undermines 
the provision of collective beneﬁ ts, since governments need to ﬁ nance the public good. This is the 
reason why taxes are compulsory (making tax evasion detrimental to the collective), and why there 
are ﬁ nes for not paying the consumption of certain collective beneﬁ ts (such as fare dodging in public 
transport). In addition, citizens are expected not to place too high of a burden on the public good, 
for example, by making realistic (and not unnecessary or excessive) claims on welfare beneﬁ ts such 
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as social security. In this study, we will investigate the public morality in relation to the public good1, 
which concerns issues such as cheating on taxes if one has the chance, paying cash to avoid taxes, 
not paying one’s fare in public transport, and claiming state beneﬁ ts one is not entitled to (Halman & 
Sieben, 2014). Individuals who have high moral standards on these topics have a prominent sense of 
civic responsibility and respect for legal norms and rules in a society (Letki, 2006). They emphasize the 
maximization of public and collective instead of private gains and loathe corruption and free-riding 
behaviour, even if the chance of getting caught is low and the threat of punishment is minimal. High 
levels of morality concerning the public good are beneﬁ cial to society, as they are the prerequisites of 
honest and compliant behaviour (Orviska & Hudson, 2002), which makes more eﬀ ective governance 
possible. If citizens ‘accept state regulations, pay taxes, and contribute to the common good, 
government will have less need of enforcing … control of citizens’ (Listhaug & Ringdal, 2004, p. 341). 
Public good morality is linked to the broader concept of civic morality, which refers to the acceptance 
of behaviours and issues that contravene the law or that ‘might be seen as falling into the area of 
behaviour where attempting to “get away with it” or not is largely a matter of personal discretion… 
[or that] involves the idea of personal honesty or dishonesty’ (Harding, Phillips, & Fogarty, 1986, p. 11).
Research shows that civic morality as well as public good morality is rather low in post-socialist 
states, especially in the countries that used to be part of the former Soviet Union (Listhaug & Ringdal, 
2004; Frey & Torgler, 2007; Halman & Sieben, 2014). This observation is worrisome in the sense 
that low levels of these types of morality are thought to lead to social dissolution and isolation, as 
people will increasingly be ‘unable to make the moral commitments that will connect them to other 
people’ (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 48). An unbridled pursuit of personal over public gains will furthermore 
undermine collective solidarity and good citizenship, which are essential anchors of society. This calls 
for research which examines these potential consequences of low levels of public good morality for 
both citizens and society. However, before this step is taken, we believe it is essential to ﬁ rst in detail 
document and explain the public good morality of individuals in post-socialist states. In the present 
study, we therefore investigate this topic by describing the state of aﬀ airs with regards to public 
good morality in no less than 23 post-socialist states in Europe, using data from the 2008 European 
Values Study (EVS, 2011). Previous research shows that there are marked individual and cross-national 
diﬀ erences in public good morality: some individuals in some post-socialist states show higher levels 
of public good morality than other individuals living in other states (Halman & Sieben, 2014). We ﬁ rst 
want to assess whether there is more variation in certain aspects of public good morality than in 
other aspects. Is, for example, the justiﬁ cation of tax evasion more widespread than the justiﬁ cation 
of beneﬁ t fraud, or is the overall pattern across countries similar? 
In the next step, we search for explanations: why do some individuals living in some post-socialist 
European states have higher levels of public good morality than their counterparts living in other 
states? As we argued elsewhere (Halman & Sieben, 2014), it seems likely that morality is not in our 
genes but something we learn and acquire. For example, the famous primatologist Frans de Waal 
(2006, pp. 166-167) argues that humans
are not born with any specifi c moral norms in mind, but with a learning agenda that tells us which 
information to imbibe….in the same way that a child is born with any particular language, but with the 
ability to learn any language, we are born to absorb moral rules and weigh moral options (de Waal, 
2006, pp. 166-167).
1 Please note that individuals’ stances on public good morality (attitude) do not necessarily correspond with il-
legal actions with respect to the public good (behaviour) or the opportunities to do so. A parallel can be drawn 
with the concept of permissiveness: ‘…being permissive does not predict what personal behaviour the indi-
vidual will display’ (Halman & De Moor, 1993, p. 58), since it does not reﬂ ect one’s own standards (which could 
be quite strict and traditional), but implies the acceptance of others having diﬀ erent standards.
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This implies that people have the capacity to learn and internalize the moral fabric of a society. 
In this respect, a society’s institutions could be important in determining its individuals’ moral 
convictions.
The literature hints at two possible avenues for institutional explanations of both individual and 
cross-national variation in public good morality in post-socialist states: the legacy of communist rule 
(Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 2012) and processes of democratization (Listhaug & Ringdal, 2004). The ﬁ rst 
explanation concerns the way the state in these societies was organized in the past: the repressive, 
authoritarian regime of the Communist Party still inﬂ uences the lives of individuals in post-socialist 
states today, although to a varying degree for diﬀ erent citizens (individual level) in diﬀ erent states 
(country level). The second explanation focuses on the period after the collapse of the communist 
regimes in the 1990s: the transition phase to market economies with full democratic institutions. As 
we will explain below, these democratization processes also work at both the individual level and 
the cross-national (country) level. In addition, we will explore whether the relationships between the 
legacy of communist rule and processes of democratization on the one hand and public good morality 
on the other hand are mediated by compliance attitudes of individuals: the level of trust they have in 
their fellow citizens and the level of conﬁ dence in their present governments.
Theory and hypotheses
Legacy of communist rule
When studying public good morality in post-socialist European states, the legacy of communist rule 
seems a straightforward factor that needs to be taken into account (see Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 
2012). After all, people living in these countries judge their current situation ‘against the memories 
of the communist past’ (Mishler & Rose, 1997, p. 434). In this past, the Communist Party and its 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism was the main and only accepted source of collective moral authority. 
Authoritarian regimes made the interests of the individual subordinate to those of the Communist 
Party. This may have led to two types of reaction when it comes to public good morality (Trüdinger 
& Hildebrandt, 2012; see also Halman & Sieben, 2014). The ﬁ rst alternative is that individuals living 
under authoritarian regimes are more law abiding. Socializing agents such as schools, the media, 
and mass organizations ‘taught’ them to place the interests of the state above their own interests, 
and there were severe repercussions for those who did not comply. Fear of punishment may be the 
leading principle to behave as expected, to respect the law and to act according to the oﬃ  cial rules. 
The other type of reaction is that harsh suppression by the state led to the development of animosity 
towards the dominant and repressive role of the communist regime. As a result, individuals do not 
feel overly obliged to fulfi l their duties to the state (Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 2012, p. 6) and will thus be 
more inclined to accept all kinds of subversive activities to undermine the state, such as tax evasion 
and beneﬁ t fraud.2 It is this second type of reaction that seems to be backed up by empirical research: 
public good morality is rather low in post-socialist states, especially in countries that used to be part 
of the former Soviet Union (Listhaug & Ringdal, 2004; Frey & Torgler, 2007; Halman & Sieben, 2014). 
2 Illegal acts such as tax evasion and beneﬁ t fraud can also be seen as survival strategies for individuals who 
struggle to make ends meet. These survival strategies were especially important in command economies where 
limited resources were available (see Polese, 2008), but may also work in the post-socialist states where infor-
mal economies play a prominent role (Rasanayam, 2011). On the other hand, it can be argued that such illegal 
actions might be more beneﬁ cial for wealthier individuals, since they have more resources to manipulate. This 
is why we will control in our analyses for the level of economic welfare at both the individual level (household 
income) and the country level (GDP per capita).
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This latter observation can be explained by the stronger hegemony of the Communist Party in 
these ex-Soviet states compared to the so-called satellite states in Central Eastern Europe. The satellite 
states were formally independent, but under heavy political and economic inﬂ uence (or control) 
by the Soviet Union. Individuals in these states had always perceived Soviet Russia as yet another 
repressive colonist power, quite alien in terms of culture and political tradition (Crawford, 1996, p. 2). This 
implies that the legacy of communist rule will in general have left greater imprints on individuals in 
communist regimes that lasted longer and that were more totalitarian, such as those found in the 
states of the former Soviet Union. After all, this provided more opportunity for communist ideology to 
penetrate all parts of society (Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 2012, p. 5). In the case of the satellite states, this 
imprint will have been less severe. We therefore expect that individuals living in former Soviet states 
will display lower levels of public good morality than individuals living in Central Eastern European 
countries (hypothesis 1).
At the individual level, we expect that the impact of communist rule will be strongest for those 
individuals who lived under a communist regime longer (cf. Halman & Sieben, 2014). For example, 
individuals who lived their entire life in the communist era experienced a lengthy time period under 
communist rule in which they were subjected to the ideology of the Communist Party and in which 
they felt the prolonged repression of the communist regime. Individuals who are relatively young 
and grew up in post-socialist societies have lived under communist rule for a shorter time and will, 
therefore, in general be less marked in this way.3 The youngest age cohorts have been raised and 
socialized in societies that recently became democratic, and as we will argue further on, among 
them public good morality is assumed to be a kind of necessity for democracies to ﬂ ourish and work 
properly (see Putnam, 1993). Our second hypothesis, therefore, is that individuals who lived under 
communist rule longer will display lower levels of public good morality than those who lived under 
communist rule for a shorter period of time (hypothesis 2).
Processes of democratization
After 1989, when the collapse of the Berlin Wall triggered the start of the breakdown of communist 
rule in Europe, all post-socialist states underwent a transition phase in which market economies 
were introduced and democratic institutions were built. Twenty years later, some countries clearly 
are further in this process than others. Full democracy has been reached only in a few post-socialist 
European states. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2008), which is 
based on scores for electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, 
political participation, and political culture, these full democracies can be found in East Germany, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia. Most post-socialist states are, however, ﬂ awed democracies in the sense 
that they have been relatively successful in achieving the political freedom and civil liberties that 
are associated with democracy, but ‘lag signiﬁ cantly in political participation and political culture 
— a reﬂ ection of widespread anomie and weaknesses of democratic development’ (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, 2008: 3). In addition, there are also post-socialist states with 
hybrid and authoritarian regimes, which are lagging in the development of freedom or have at least 
partly fallen back into an authoritarian mode of governing (Mishler & Rose, 2001).
Ever since the seminal study by Almond and Verba (1963), it is widely recognized that in order 
to survive, democracies require political cultures that encourage citizens’ societal engagement, 
involvement and participation. The stability and eﬀ ectiveness of democratic governments appears to 
depend upon people’s orientations that must be favourable to the political democratic process. Living 
in a democracy implies that individuals have to endorse the norms and obligations of democratic life 
3 It should be noted that communist repression varied across decades, countries, as well as groups in the popu-
lation (such as higher versus lower strata in society). We are not able to make detailed distinctions here, and 
therefore focus on a general, rather crude, impact of communist rule in life.
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(Van Deth, 2007; see also Kymlicka & Norman, 2000), which include a number of civic virtues such 
as responsibility, cooperation, commitment, loyalty, tolerance, solidarity, law abidance, involvement, 
activism and engagement. Since democracies do not have the repressive abilities of totalitarian 
regimes to enforce laws, the survival of democracies depends on the public support of the system 
and its institutions and the willingness of citizens to comply with the societal rules of good conduct, 
which implies conformation to democratic laws and rules. More than any other system of government, 
democracy depends on citizens’ voluntary compliance or what we will call ‘norm obedience’ (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005, p. 247).
Thus democracies more or less require from its citizens to be societally engaged, to behave 
responsibly, to support the norms and obligations related to solidarity, and to obey laws both from 
an individual and a societal perspective (Van Deth, 2007). Hence we expect that individuals living in 
more democratic societies will value the collective and the public good more than individuals who are 
living in less democratic societies, as individuals in the latter countries will feel less tied and loyal to 
the system. Our hypothesis at the country level, therefore, is as follows: Individuals who live in more 
democratic states will display higher levels of public good morality than individuals who live in less 
democratic states (hypothesis 3). At the individual level, we may expect that individuals who highly 
value democratic ideals will also cherish ideals of the ‘good’ society and the ‘good’ citizen. They will 
be loyal to the rules of good conduct and more eager to conform to societal laws. In other words, they 
are more likely to emphasize civic honesty and to stress norm obedience with respect to the collective 
than individuals with lower levels of democratic values. We, therefore, hypothesize that individuals 
who hold more democratic values will display higher levels of public good morality than individuals 
who hold less democratic values (hypothesis 4).
Compliance attitudes: interpersonal trust and conﬁ dence in government
So far, we argued that the legacy of communist rule and democratization are plausible explanations 
for variations in public good morality, both at the individual level and at the country level. We would 
like to take these explanations one step further and claim that the above mentioned relationships can 
(to a certain extent) be mediated by what we label as compliance attitudes. We will ﬁ rst discuss what 
these attitudes comprise and how they are related to morality on the public good, after which we will 
describe their association with communist rule and democracy.
In general, two motives can be distinguished for compliance and cooperative orientations (Tyler, 
2011; see also Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 2012): instrumental or rational considerations on the one 
hand and group or community orientations (such as group identity) on the other. Here we focus on 
the rational considerations for compliance, which refer not only to the likelihood of being caught 
and the size of penalties in case of breaking the law, but also to the behaviour of others and to that 
of the government. More speciﬁ cally, these considerations are linked to the compliance attitudes of 
interpersonal trust (horizontal trust) and conﬁ dence in government (vertical trust).
With respect to interpersonal trust, research shows that the extent to which others in a society 
comply matters for one’s own compliance, since ‘no one prefers to be a ‘sucker’(Levi, 1988, p. 53). 
This implies that perceptions and evaluations of these others are important attributes of people’s 
ethical decisions and moral reasoning. If fellow citizens are considered trustworthy, they are being 
trusted and it is assumed that they will not take advantage of the society and its citizens. Therefore, 
it feels like a moral obligation that no one will engage in or accept misconduct (see e.g., Oﬀ e, 1999), 
which implies that individuals are less prone to engage in uncivil behaviour or free-riding activities. 
Research shows that interpersonal trust is indeed linked to civic and public good morality (Scholz, 
1998; Frey & Torgler, 2007), although others did not ﬁ nd such empirical evidence (Letki, 2006; Halman 
& Sieben, 2014). In addition, it is observed that individuals who trust their fellow citizens are on the 
whole less likely to lie, cheat, or steal (Putnam, 2000, p. 137) than less trusting individuals. It is very 
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probable that trusting individuals also do not accept this dishonest behaviour from others, which 
suggests that individuals with higher levels of interpersonal trust have higher levels of public good 
morality. At the same time, it can be argued that interpersonal trust is related to both the legacy of 
communist rule and to democratization, although in opposite directions. Living in a communist and 
authoritarian regime, individuals under communist rule tried to overcome the diﬃ  culties of these 
regimes (and of command economies in particular) by forming close-knit networks with family and 
friends who could help. The radius of trust (Fukuyama, 2000) was small, including family and close 
friends, but excluding others. This communist legacy seems to be still at work in post-socialist states 
today, as interpersonal trust is observed to be relatively low in these countries (Mishler & Rose, 2001). 
With respect to democratization, it is observed that democratic governance is associated with more 
reliable, predictable and transparent institutional structures than authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanas, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Democracies are more likely to implement 
impartial policies through fair procedures. In addition, they create stronger and more reliable legal 
systems, which not only strengthen the deterrent eﬀ ects of law, but also reinforce perceptions of 
transparent and fair institutional design (Levi, 1988; Tyler, 1998). Hence more democratic systems are 
considered to be fairer, more eﬃ  cient and less corrupt. In such societies, trust will be higher because, 
as Uslaner (1999, p. 140) argues, only in democracies is trust a rational gamble. Indeed, research shows 
that interpersonal trust and stable democracy are closely linked (e.g., Inglehart, 1999). Although full 
democracies as such do not produce trust, it is clear that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in 
particular destroy faith in others (Uslaner, 1999). The latter forces citizens to conform to societal 
rules. Alternative centres of power are not allowed and are even suppressed. In stable democracies 
on the other hand, individuals obey rules and laws, not because they are forced to do so and fear 
punishment if they don’t, but because the legal system is considered to be fair and legitimate. Given 
the described relationships between communist rule, democracy, interpersonal trust and public good 
morality, we expect that the level of interpersonal trust can (partly) explain the association between 
the legacy of communist rule and democratization on the one hand and public good morality on the 
other hand (hypothesis 5). It should be noted that our cross-sectional study design does not allow us 
to test this mediation in a strict causal sense. Both compliance attitudes and public good morality are 
personal dispositions, which are likely to develop simultaneously, inﬂ uenced by the same individual 
and country-level factors.
Next to this horizontal dimension of trust (i.e. trust between citizens), vertical trust, that is trust 
between citizens and the state, is an important factor in explaining public good morality (Frey & 
Torgler, 2007). It is the state that ultimately determines what legal behaviour is by describing its 
norms and rules in laws. Obedience to and respect for these norms and rules will be determined by 
the performance of state institutions that provide these rules and norms. When these institutions 
are considered to be legitimate, are accepted by citizens and when they are functioning well, then it 
is much easier for citizens to comply with their norms and standards. Indeed, research shows that 
trust in government and state institutions such as the parliament, civil service, the police, the legal 
system, etc., is positively associated with civic morality, tax morale, and public good morality (Letki, 
2006; Frey & Torgler, 2007; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Halman & Sieben, 2014). Furthermore, conﬁ dence 
in government and its institutions appear to be not very high in post-socialist states (Mishler & 
Rose, 2001; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). In the past, the communist regime forced people to compliance 
through repression and this led to massive alienation and distrust of the communist regime and a 
lingering cynicism toward both political and civil institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997, p. 420), which is 
still noticeable today. In full democracies, citizens’ trust in government and state institutions is much 
higher (e.g., Norris, 1999). Next to the earlier mentioned observations that democratic governance 
is more reliable, eﬃ  cient, and fair (Letki, 2006), political leaders in more democratic states depend 
on popular support and are, therefore, more likely to implement policies that serve the majority of 
citizens. This generates more conﬁ dence in the state than in less democratic states (Levi & Stoker, 
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2000). Since conﬁ dence in government is associated with higher levels of public good morality and at 
the same time is related to communist rule and democracy, we expect that it can (partly) explain the 
association between the legacy of communist rule and democratisation, on the one hand, and public 
good morality on the other hand (hypothesis 6). Again, it must be emphasized that we cannot make 
any claims about causal eﬀ ects with our cross-sectional design.
Data and operationalization
We test the hypotheses mentioned above by employing data from the 2008 European Values Study 
(EVS, 2011). In this large-scale, cross-national research project, survey data on the human values of 
Europeans are collected. In all European countries with a population of more than 100,000, a random 
sample of about 1,500 respondents is interviewed about their opinions and attitudes with respect to 
important domains in life such as family, religion, work, and politics. In all participating countries, the 
same structured questionnaire and rigid methodological guidelines are followed. In addition, much 
attention is paid to the translation process. As a result, the EVS data are of high quality and quite 
comparable cross-nationally. For more information on the data, we refer the reader to the European 
Values Study website at www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
From the 47 countries included in the survey, we select all post-socialist European states except for 
Kosovo and Azerbaijan. Kosovo is excluded because of lacking relevant macro indicators on the level of 
democracy and GDP per capita in the country, whereas Azerbaijan is excluded because the EVS team 
expressed serious doubts about the data quality. It should be noted that with respect to Germany, 
we only include the eastern part (i.e. the former GDR) in our study, since the western part did not 
experience communist rule in the past. In total, we have information on citizens in 23 post-socialist 
European countries: Albania (AL), Armenia (AM), Belarus (BY), Bosnia-Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), 
Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), East-Germany (DE-E), Estonia (EE), Georgia (GE), Hungary (HU), 
Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Macedonia (MK), Moldova (MD), Montenegro (ME), Poland (PL), Romania 
(RO), Russian Federation (RU), Serbia (RS), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), and Ukraine (UA). We 
exclude all respondents who did not experience communist rule in their lives because they are too 
young (n=355). In addition, respondents with missing information on key variables4 are excluded, which 
leaves us with 31,354 cases for the analyses. The sample is weighted to adjust for the populations’ 
distribution of gender and age.
To measure public good morality, the respondents are presented a battery of 20 actions and 
behaviours that refer to sexual-ethical permissiveness as well as civic permissiveness (cf. Halman & de 
Moor, 1993). They are asked to what extent these actions and behaviours can be justiﬁ ed on a ten-point 
scale from 1 being the action or behaviour can never be justifi ed to 10 being the action or behaviour can 
always be justifi ed. Please note that this question asks respondents to give a ‘general moral opinion’ 
(see also note 1). Since we are interested in activities that harm the public good, we focus on a speciﬁ c 
part of civic permissiveness and include the following four indicators in our analyses:
a) claiming state beneﬁ ts to which you are not entitled; 
b) cheating on taxes if you have the chance;
c) paying cash to avoid taxes; and
d) not paying the fare on public transport.
The respondents’ answers to these four items are mirrored and averaged in order to measure the 
concept of public good morality. This scale is reliable with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .765. Detailed 
reliability analyses indicate that this holds for all post-socialist states in our sample (Cronbach’s 
4 More detailed information on the handling of missing values is given when we discuss the operationalization 
of speciﬁ c variables.
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alphas higher than .700), with the exception of Armenia (.556) and Romania (.641). However, excluding 
speciﬁ c items from the scale does not lead to improvements in reliability in the latter two countries, 
which is why we consider the scale of public good morality to work in all 23 countries studied here.
In order to explain variation in public good morality in post-socialist Europe, we ﬁ rst focus on the 
‘legacy of communist rule’. For each respondent, we construct a variable that rather crudely measures 
the length of communist rule during his or her life by combining information on birth year and the 
year that communist rule started and ended in the country of residence. For example, communism 
took power in 1917 in Russia, followed by Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova in the 
1920s, the Baltic states in 1940, and all other Eastern European countries after the Second World 
War. Communist rule ended between 1989 (the year the Berlin Wall fell) and 1991 (collapse of the 
Soviet Union), so individuals born in the 1970s experienced communist rule for a much shorter time 
period than individuals born in the 1940s. At the country level, a distinction is made between the 
former Soviet Union and its satellite states. The latter may have been less severely suppressed during 
communism. Therefore, a dummy is created for countries that used to be part of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU); the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries are the reference category.
The second explanation for variation in public good morality in post-socialist Europe lies in 
processes of democratization. The respondents’ democratic values are measured by combining their 
answers (disagree strongly, disagree, agree, agree strongly) with ﬁ ve statements:
a) Having a democratic political system is a good way to govern the country;
b) Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government; 
c) In democracy, the economic system runs badly; 
d) Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling; and 
e) Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order. 
The latter three statements are reversed coded. These ﬁ ve items form a reliable scale with an 
overall Cronbach’s alpha of .735. It should be noted that a substantial part of the respondents (more 
than 10% in all countries except for Hungary and Slovenia) didn’t express their opinion on these 
statements or responded ‘don’t know’. To deal with these missing observations, we imputed them by 
the average level of democratic values in the country of residence. To account for this, we will include 
a dummy variable with the score ‘1’ if information was originally missing in the analyses. After all, 
individuals with missing information on democratic values might be a very speciﬁ c group, also with 
respect to public good morality. To measure democracy at the country level, we use The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008, which ranges from 0 (no democracy at all) to 10 (very 
democratic).5
We also look at respondents’ compliance attitudes, i.e. interpersonal trust and conﬁ dence in 
government. Interpersonal trust, or trust in other people, is measured by combining three questions 
in EVS 2008. First, respondents are asked whether (1) they think most people can be trusted or that (2) 
one cannot be too careful in dealing with people. This dichotomous item is complemented6 with two ten-
point semantic diﬀ erential scales: one item has as extremes (1) most people would try to take advantage 
of me versus (10) most people would try to be fair; the other item has as opposite poles (1) people mostly 
look out for themselves versus (10) people mostly try to be helpful. The three items together form a scale 
with an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .660, which is quite acceptable for a scale with only three items. 
‘Conﬁ dence in government’ is indicated by levels of trust in governmental institutions, such as the 
educational system, the police, the parliament, civil service, the social security system, the health 
care system, the justice system, political parties, and the government. Respondents expressed their 
conﬁ dence in these nine organizations ranging from 1 = very much; 2 = quite some conﬁ dence; 3 = no 
conﬁ dence; to 4 = no conﬁ dence at all. After mirroring the answer categories and averaging them, a 
highly reliable scale is constructed (overall Cronbach’s alpha = .876).
5 See http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.
6 To combine the dichotomous item with the two ten-point items, we recode the answer categories of the former 
(1=10 and 2=1) to match the ten-point scales. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual-level (n=31,354) and country-level (n=23) variables
 Minimum Maximum Mean Sd
Individual-level variables
Morality on the public good 1.000 10.000 8.405 1.768
Gender: female 0.000 1.000 0.525
Educational level 0.000 6.000 3.236 1.213
Having a partner 0.000 1.000 0.671
Having children 0.000 1.000 0.724
Secular orientation -1.972 1.777 0.010 0.889
Monthly household income (in ppp) 0.010 14.728 0.804 0.826
Missings on household income 0.000 1.000 0.146
Communist rule in life (in years) 1.000 72.000 26.773 15.516
Democratic values 1.000 4.000 2.202 0.508
Missings on democratic values 0.000 1.000 0.106
Interpersonal trust 1.000 10.000 4.185 2.276
Conﬁ dence in government 1.000 4.000 2.276 0.585
Country-level variables
Former Soviet State 0.000 1.000 0.391
Democracy index 3.340 8.820 6.571 1.360
GDP per capita (in ppp / 1,000 dollars) 3.004 35.666 15.066 8.171
Source: EVS 2008, World Economic Report (IMF) 2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit 2008
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of country-level variables per country
Country 
code
Country
name
N
Average public 
good morality
Former Soviet 
State
Democracy 
index
GDP 
per capita7
AL Albania 1413 8.443 no 5.91 6.911
AM Armenia 1378 8.652 yes 4.09 5.809
BA Bosnia Herzegovina 1423 8.769 no 5.70 7.791
BU Bulgaria 1299 9.143 no 7.02 13.192
BY Belarus 1343 7.316 yes 3.34 12.587
CZ Czech Republic 1534 8.128 no 8.19 25.191
DE-E Germany East 936 8.956 no 8.82 35.666
EE Estonia 1467 8.392 yes 7.68 20.327
GE Georgia 1346 9.030 yes 4.62 4.912
HR Croatia 1416 8.276 no 7.04 18.605
HU Hungary 1431 8.933 no 7.44 19.413
LT Lithuania 1303 7.695 yes 7.36 19.145
LV Latvia 1464 7.867 yes 7.23 17.187
MD Moldova 1446 8.532 yes 6.50 3.004
ME Montenegro 1383 8.885 no 6.43 11.063
MK Macedonia 1364 8.724 no 6.21 9.600
PL Poland 1322 8.115 no 7.30 17.598
RO Romania 1285 8.278 no 7.06 12.645
RS Serbia 1405 9.056 no 6.49 10.805
RU Russian Federation 1346 7.578 yes 4.48 16.043
SI Slovenia 1311 8.419 no 7.96 29.679
SK Slovak Republic 1368 7.866 no 7.33 22.002
UA Ukraine 1371 8.398 yes 6.94 7.347
Source: EVS 2008, World Economic Report (IMF) 2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit 20087
7 GDP per capita in ppp / 1,000 dollars.
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Finally, we include a number of control variables in our analyses. First we control for the level 
of economic welfare, both at the individual level and the country level. This might pick up the idea 
of public good morality as a survival strategy (see note 2). Respondents could indicate their level of 
income by ticking one of the country-speciﬁ c categories for monthly household income after taxes. To 
create a comparable income measure across countries, the country-speciﬁ c categories were converted 
into euros using purchasing power parity rates. If information on household income was missing – 
about 15% of the respondents did not answer this question — we imputed it by the average income 
level in the country. We will include a dummy variable (score 1 if information was originally missing) 
in the analyses to account for this. At the country level, we include the level of economic development 
indicated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (ppp) per capita in 
thousand dollars in 2008 from the International Monetary Fund.8 Next to economic welfare, research 
shows that other important determinants of morality are gender, educational level, family status, and 
a secular orientation (e.g., Letki, 2006; Torgler, 2006; Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010). We therefore 
create a dummy variable for gender with men as the reference category. Educational level is measured 
by recoding country-speciﬁ c educational classiﬁ cations into the internationally comparable ISCED 
classiﬁ cation, with codes ranging from 0 (pre-primary education or none education) to 6 (second 
stage of tertiary education). Family status is measured by two dummy variables, indicating whether 
one has a partner and has one or more children respectively. Finally, secular orientation is measured by 
combining information on church attendance and religious belief. The latter is tapped by the question 
How important is God in your life?, with answering categories ranging from 1 = not important to 10 = 
very important. We mirrored these answering categories, since individuals with a secular orientation 
are expected to hold the view that God is not very important in their lives. Church attendance is 
based on the question Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services? The answer categories range from 0 (never) to 7 (more than once a week). In order to 
combine both items into one scale, the answers are ﬁ rst transformed into z-scores and then averaged. 
The Pearson correlation coeﬃ  cient between the two items is .556.
Table 1 displays descriptive information of all individual level and country level variables that are 
used in the analyses, whereas Table 2 provides information on the macro-level indicators per country.
Results
Figure 1 shows that individuals in post-socialist countries on average display quite high levels of public 
good morality. An overall average of 8.4 on a ten-point scale where ‘10’ indicates strictness and ‘1’ 
is most lenient does not demonstrate that behaviour such as tax evasion, fare dodging, and beneﬁ t 
8 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx.
Table 3: Correlations between individual-level and country-level variables and morality on the public 
good (n=31,354)
 r   r  
Individual-level variables Country-level variables
Communist rule in life 0.212 ** Former Soviet State -0.109 **
Democratic values -0.051 ** Democracy index 0.042 **
Missings on democratic values 0.010 *
Interpersonal trust -0.023 **
Conﬁ dence in government 0.064 **    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (one-tailed)
Source: European Value Study 2008
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fraud is viewed as justiﬁ able in this part of Europe. In fact, 41% of the respondents express that such 
behaviours can never be justiﬁ ed. No less than 75% scores at least ‘8’ and almost 93% scores at least 
‘6’ on the ten-point scale. This means that only 7% of the Europeans in post-socialist states are on the 
‘lenient’ side of the public good morality scale. Based on these outcomes, we may infer that worries 
about low levels of this kind of morality leading to less collective solidarity and citizenship in post-
socialist states do not seem to be warranted.9
However, given the overall rather high level of public good morality in post-socialist Europe, we 
see some interesting diﬀ erences between countries. Individuals living in Belarus, Russia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, and Latvia are relatively permissive when it comes to justifying claiming state beneﬁ ts one 
is not entitled to, cheating on taxes if one has the chance, paying cash to avoid taxes, and not paying 
the fare on public transport. The average scores on public good morality range from 7.3 to 7.9 in these 
countries. It is quite remarkable that four of these ﬁ ve countries used to be part of the former Soviet 
Union (see the black bars in the ﬁ gure). On the other side of the spectrum, Hungary, East Germany, 
Georgia, Serbia, and Bulgaria score very high (i.e. average score of about 9 and higher) on public good 
9 Black bars indicate former Soviet states, white bars indicate Central European Countries.
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Figure 1: Average morality on the public good in post-socialist countries9
Source: European Values Study 2008
Figure 2: Average scores on public good morality items per country
Source: European Values Study 2008
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morality. Here, it is noteworthy that this top ﬁ ve of strictness in public good morality includes only 
one ex-Soviet state. Although the pattern in Figure 1 is not crystal clear (other former Soviet countries 
show a rather mixed conﬁ guration with other Central Eastern European countries), we tentatively 
conclude that individuals living in countries that were once part of the Soviet Union seem to be 
somewhat less strict towards public good morality that those who live in Central Eastern Europe. 
The association between public good morality and the second institutional dimension we investigate 
in this study, namely processes of democratization, is ambiguous in Figure 1. The two countries that 
score lowest on public good morality (Belarus and Russia) are indeed the least democratic societies. 
However, the pattern for the other countries is rather mixed with more and less democratic countries 
ending up at both ends of the public good morality spectrum.
Figure 2 shows the mean scores per country for each morality item separately. The bars conﬁ rm 
the general picture described above. Public good morality is relatively ‘low’ in Belarus and Russia, 
particularly with respect to dodging a fare in public transport. Overall, individuals in post-socialist 
countries appear most ‘lenient’ towards this activity – together with paying cash to avoid taxes, which 
scores remarkably low in Macedonia. Claiming state beneﬁ ts one is not entitled to is, on the other 
hand, evaluated as least justiﬁ able in 15 out of 23 countries. However, in general we observe that the 
variation between the diﬀ erent morality items within a country is rather modest, which is why we 
focus on the combined measure of public good morality in the remainder of this study.
Bivariate analyses
As a ﬁ rst test of our hypotheses, we look at the bivariate correlations between public good morality 
and both individual level and country level variables. Table 3 shows that the legacy of communist rule 
is signiﬁ cantly associated with public good morality. Conformant to our observations above, living 
in a former Soviet state is related to less strict standards with respect to the public good. However, 
looking at communist rule at the individual level, we notice that the length of experiencing communist 
regimes in life is in general associated with higher levels of public good morality. Individuals who 
experienced communist rule during their whole life are most strict when it comes to tax evasion, fare 
dodging, and beneﬁ t fraud, whereas those who were socialized in the last days of communism and 
who in adult life experienced the transition to market economies are the most permissive.
Democratization is also signiﬁ cantly related to public good morality. Individuals living in more 
democratic countries, as indicated by higher scores on the democracy index, have higher levels of 
public good morality. Surprisingly, individuals with more democratic values are associated with less 
strict attitudes towards the public good, whereas respondents who were unable or unwilling to give 
their opinion on democracy as a political system appear to be somewhat stricter in this respect. 
Finally, and quite remarkably, interpersonal trust is associated with lower levels of public good 
morality. Conﬁ dence in government and its institutions is, on the other hand, related to higher levels 
of morality.
Multilevel analyses
Since we want to know if the found relationships also hold when control variables are included in 
the analyses, we perform a linear multilevel regression analysis. This method of analyses is needed 
to correct for the fact that individuals are not independent observations but are nested in countries 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999). We estimate so-called random intercept models, which allow the intercept 
to vary across countries, while assuming that the slopes of the independent variables are the same 
across countries. We ﬁ rst estimate an empty model without any independent variables, which allows 
us to partition the variance in public good morality at the individual level and at the country level. 
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The calculated intraclass correlation10 reveals that 7.5% of the variability in individual public good 
morality can be attributed to diﬀ erences between countries and the remaining 92.5% to diﬀ erences 
between individuals. In other words, a vast majority of the diﬀ erences in public good morality between 
individuals in post-socialist states can be explained by looking at individual characteristics, whereas 
only a small part can be explained by characteristics of the country they live in.
We extend this empty multilevel model in a stepwise procedure. In Model 1, we include – next to all 
control variables – our crude measures of the legacy of communist rule at both the individual level and 
country level. Model 2 shows estimated coeﬃ  cients for the impact of individuals’ democratic values 
and countries’ democracy index, again controlled for important individual level and country level 
variables. Model 3 combines these variables showing the net eﬀ ects of the legacy of communist rule 
and democratization on public good morality. Finally, in Model 4, we include individuals’ interpersonal 
trust and conﬁ dence in government in the analyses to see whether these compliance attitudes can 
mediate the relationships between the legacy of communist rule and democratization on the one 
hand and public good morality on the other hand. Of course, strong causal claims should be avoided 
since we are dealing with cross-sectional data. The results of the multilevel analyses on these four 
models can be found in Table 4.
The estimates of Model 1 substantiate the results of the bivariate analysis described above. 
Controlled for the individual level characteristics of gender, educational level, family status, secular 
orientation, and income, as well as for GDP per capita11 at the country level, individuals living in former 
Soviet states display lower levels of public good morality than individuals living in Central Eastern 
European countries. On average, this diﬀ erence amounts to 0.5 on a ten-point scale. The length of 
communist rule in life, however, is associated with higher levels of public good morality.12 For each 
year that individuals lived longer under the communist regimes, their public good morality increases 
by 0.020.13 This means that the diﬀ erence between those with the least experience of living under 
communist rule (i.e. young people who lived one year – as babies – under the communist regime) and 
those with most experience (i.e. 72 years in our sample) is 1.42 on a ten-point scale.14 The results of 
Model 1 also show that women, those with higher education, individuals with children, lower income 
groups and religious people appear to be more strict than their counterparts and, therefore, less likely 
to accept the norm oﬀ ensive behaviours that are part of our measure of public good morality. Having 
a partner or living in a country with a high level of economic welfare does, however, not seem to 
aﬀ ect public good morality.
In Model 2, we look at the relationship between democratization and public good morality. In 
line with the results of the bivariate analyses, we ﬁ nd that individuals who hold more democratic 
values display lower levels of public good morality, whereas those who did not reveal their opinion on 
10 The variance component at the individual level equals 2.856 with a standard error of .023, whereas the variance 
component at the country level is .230 with a standard error of .068. The intraclass coeﬃ  cient is calculated by 
0.230/(2.856+0.230) = 0.075.
11 Additional analyses without the country level indicator of economic welfare (GDP per capita in ppp) show simi-
lar results for all models presented here (results available upon request). There is one exception: the coeﬃ  cient 
for democracy at the country level in Model 2 is not signiﬁ cant when GDP per capita is excluded. This hints at 
a suppressor eﬀ ect: only when controlling for economic welfare in a country, the democracy index is negatively 
related to the public good morality of individuals living in that country. This suppressor eﬀ ect is caused by a 
positive correlation between GDP per capita and the democracy index (r = 0.676).
12 We also estimated models in which we separately include length of communist rule in life and living in a former 
Soviet state, but there are no diﬀ erences in coeﬃ  cients as presented here. This shows that the negative rela-
tionship between living in a former Soviet state and public good morality is not caused by a composition eﬀ ect, 
meaning that these countries do not inhabit more individuals with shorter (or longer, but this is contradictory 
to the positive association between length of communist rule in life and public good morality) periods under 
communist rule than in Central Eastern Europe.
13 Analyses show that the length of communist rule in life is in a linear way related to public good morality. Al-
ternative ways of specifying this relationship (e.g., adding a quadratic term) do not lead to signiﬁ cant improve-
ments in model ﬁ t.
14 Calculated as (72*0.020) – (1*0.020).
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democracy as a political system have higher morality levels. In addition, living in a more democratic 
country is associated with less permissiveness towards activities that harm society and the collective. 
The diﬀ erence in public good morality between the least democratic country (Belarus with a 
democracy index of 3.34) and the most democratic country (East Germany with a democracy index of 
8.82) amounts to 1.25 on a ten-point scale.15
In a next step, we combine the individual level and country level indicators for the legacy of 
communist rule and democratization, together with the control variables, in one model. The results 
for the individual level variables in this Model 3 very much resemble the results in Model 1 and 2. 
The only exception is that having missing information on democratic values is no longer signiﬁ cantly 
related to public good morality. With respect to the country level variables, we still observe that 
individuals who live in countries that were part of the Soviet Union appear to score lower on public 
good morality than individuals in other post-socialist European countries. The level of democracy in 
a country is, however, not related to public good morality anymore, which is probably caused by the 
fact that ex-Soviet states on average score lower on the democracy index ((correlation between the 
democracy index and a dummy variable indicating whether a country used to be part of the former 
Soviet Union r = –0.462).
Comparing the variance components of the ﬁ rst three models reveals that our crude measures 
of the legacy of communist rule are more powerful predictors of public good morality than the 
indicators for democratization. The length of communist rule in life – together with all individual level 
control variables – explains 6.2% of all diﬀ erences in public good morality between individuals within 
countries, whereas democratic values explain 4.2%. At the country level, living in a former Soviet state 
explains 6.3% more of the variance in public good morality than living in a more democratic country.16 
When combined, all these factors account for 35.2% of the variance in public good morality at the 
country level.
Finally, in Model 4, we simultaneously add the two compliance attitudes, i.e. individuals’ 
interpersonal trust and conﬁ dence in government, after we checked whether stepwise including them 
separately gives similar results. From the results of this model, it becomes clear that interpersonal 
trust is not related to public good morality. Its coeﬃ  cient is insigniﬁ cant, even in a model that includes 
only this compliance attitude and all control variables (results available upon request). In addition, 
the estimates of all other variables do not change in Model 4 compared to Model 3. This implies that 
interpersonal trust apparently does not mediate the relationship between the legacy of communist 
rule and democratization. However, individuals who have more conﬁ dence in government and its 
institutions have higher levels of public good morality than people who trust their governments less. 
Adding conﬁ dence in government does not alter the estimate for the length of communist rule in 
life, whereas the coeﬃ  cient for democratic values decreases with only 13.9%.17 This suggests that 
the presumed mediating eﬀ ect of this variable is quite modest, although we cannot make any causal 
claims based on these cross-sectional analyses. At the country level, conﬁ dence in government seems 
to slightly increase the estimates of living in a former Soviet state and the democracy index (with 5.1% 
and 10.8% respectively), but such a suppressor eﬀ ect cannot be labelled as signiﬁ cant.
15 Calculated as (8.82*0.227) – (3.34*0.227).
16 In order to compare variance components fairly between models, we estimated additional models which in-
clude, next to all control variables, the indicators of communist rule and democracy separately. The results 
show that the dummy variable for a former Soviet state, together with all controls, explains 22.4% of the 
variance in public good morality between countries, whereas the democracy index, together with all controls, 
explains 16.2% (results are available upon request). These additional analyses also show that composition ef-
fects of the individual level indicators of the length of communist rule in life and democratic values are modest. 
The fact that some countries inhabit more individuals who experienced lengthier periods under communist 
regimes, while other countries populate more individuals who lived under communist rule for a shorter time 
explains 24.2% - 22.4% = 1.7% of all diﬀ erences in public good morality between countries. The composition 
eﬀ ect of individual democratic values accounts for 20.6% - 16.2% = 4.4% of the country-level variance in public 
good morality.
17 Calculated as (-0.158 – -0.136) / -0.158.
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Conclusion and discussion
In this study, we investigated the potential conﬂ ict that may arise between the public justifying certain 
behaviour that the state deﬁ nes as illegal. More speciﬁ cally, we studied public good morality in post-
socialist Europe. Public good morality concerns the (non)acceptance of behaviour that contravenes 
the law and harms society or the greater good of the collective, such as cheating on taxes if one has 
the chance, paying cash to avoid taxes, not paying one’s fare in public transport, and claiming state 
beneﬁ ts one is not entitled to. Previous research showed that this kind of morality is rather low in 
post-socialist states, particularly in countries that used to be part of the former Soviet Union (Listhaug 
& Ringdal, 2004; Frey & Torgler, 2007; Halman & Sieben, 2014). Using data from the European Values 
Study in 2008 on 23 post-socialist countries in Europe, we show that individuals in contemporary 
post-socialist European societies have quite a strong sense of public good morality. The overall average 
in this part of Europe is 8.4 on a ten-point scale. Only 7% of the respondents appear to be on the 
‘permissive’ side of the public good morality scale (scores of 5.5 and lower). In addition, we observed 
that the variation between the diﬀ erent morality items is rather modest. This means that individuals 
in post-socialist Europe are rather unanimous in the rejection of uncivic and indecent behaviours that 
harm the public good. A main conclusion, therefore, is that the threat of a moral decay leading to 
social dissolution and isolation that will undermine collective solidarity and citizenship seems to be 
unwarranted.
Despite the fact that large majorities in post-socialist European states do not display low levels 
of public good morality, we observe some important diﬀ erences between individuals and between 
countries. Trying to make sense of these diﬀ erences, however small they may be, we forwarded six 
hypotheses about individual level characteristics and country level attributes, which all are related to 
societal institutions. After all, the literature on public good morality hinted at two possible avenues 
for institutional explanations: legacy of communist rule (Trüdinger & Hildebrandt, 2012) and processes 
of democratization (Listhaug & Ringdal, 2004). We ﬁ rst of all predicted that individuals who lived 
under communist rule might have strong negative feelings against the state because of its repressive, 
communist legacy. This would, in general, result in lower levels of public good morality, especially 
for those living in the former Soviet Union (country level) and for those who longer experienced 
communist rule in life (individual level). We partly had to reject these hypotheses. The multivariate 
multilevel regression analyses revealed that people living in ex-Soviet states are indeed less strict 
towards activities that undermine the public good, which is in line with hypothesis 1. The diﬀ erence 
amounts to 0.5 on the ten-point public good morality scale. However, individuals who lived longer 
under communist rule are not the most ‘lenient’. On the contrary, they appear to be the strictest 
when it comes to cheating on taxes if one has the chance, paying cash to avoid taxes, not paying a 
fare on public transport, and justifying claiming state beneﬁ ts one is not entitled to. This contradicts 
hypothesis 2 and suggests that the underlying mechanism of developing animosity against the state 
works more strongly for the younger generation, who only lived under communist rule for a relatively 
short period of time. They might have been more inﬂ uenced by the period after the collapse of 
the communist regime, when their country went through the sometimes diﬃ  cult transformation 
processes towards a market economy and a stable democracy. These transformation processes were 
not without failures and hiccups and might have led to alienation or even hostility towards the state, 
especially in young people who had high hopes. This might explain the relatively low levels of public 
good morality for young individuals in post-socialist states. The older generation, on the other hand, 
might be much more indoctrinated by the communist regime to give top priority to the interests of 
the state. Life-long exposure to possible repercussions might have left an enduring imprint, which 
is not cancelled out by the turbulent transformation processes after the collapse of the communist 
regime. More research, preferably combining quantitative data with in-depth interview techniques, is 
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needed to shed light on these psychological processes and their relation with law abiding attitudes. 
Such research could also shed more light on the distinct faces of communist regimes across countries, 
decades, as well as groups in the population (such as higher and lower strata in society).
In order to examine the second institutional explanation for diﬀ erences in public good morality, we 
looked at processes of democratization. The transformation to a market economy with full democratic 
institutions has been more successful in some post-socialist states than in others. We predicted that 
individuals living in more democratic societies would display higher levels of public good morality 
than individuals living in less democratic societies. This third hypothesis is not substantiated. At 
ﬁ rst sight, post-socialist democracies do seem to produce more support for public good morality, 
since the democracy index is positively related to our measure of public good morality. However, this 
relationship disappears when we take into account whether a country is a former Soviet state or a 
former satellite state, because these two country characteristics (level of democracy and former Soviet 
state) are related. For example, the former Soviet states of Belarus, Armenia, Russia, and Georgia are 
the least democratic states in post-socialist Europe (see Table 2). In addition, our hypothesis at the 
individual level predicting that individuals with more democratic values would be more supportive 
to public good morality than individuals with less democratic values is also not corroborated. On the 
contrary, more democratic individuals appear to belong to the more morally permissive parts of the 
populations. 
Finally, compliance attitudes such as interpersonal trust and conﬁ dence in government do not 
seem to mediate the relationship between the legacy of communist rule and democratization on 
the one hand and public good morality on the other hand. First, interpersonal trust is not related to 
individuals’ moral attitudes towards public good. One could speculate that this is because individuals 
in post-socialist states have a small radius of trust (Fukuyama, 2000): they only trust their family and 
close friends and no one else. However, research shows that interpersonal trust is also not associated 
with public good morality in the western part of Europe (Halman & Sieben, 2014), where levels of 
trust in others are much higher (see Halman, Sieben, & van Zundert, 2011). With respect to the second 
compliance attitude, we observed that individuals who have conﬁ dence in their government and its 
institutions are stricter when it comes to law abiding behaviours. Thus, trust in government is related 
to public good morality in the expected way. However, the possible mediating role of this attitude is 
very limited, since it hardly aﬀ ects the estimated coeﬃ  cients of the legacy of communist rule and 
democratization on public good morality. These ﬁ ndings, together with the limited explanatory power 
of our models (i.e. only 7% of the variance in public good morality at the individual level is explained), 
suggest that future research should focus on other mechanisms to explain public good morality in 
post-socialist Europe. One promising route would be to investigate the moral underpinnings of wealth 
and consumption under Soviet socialism and under capitalism (cf. Wanner, 2005). The transition to a 
market economy opened up new opportunities for certain groups in society to increase their individual 
wealth, also in illegal ways. The role of the political and governmental elite in a post-socialist society 
seems to play a prominent role here, and also the position of entrepreneurs is an interesting topic for 
future research. Furthermore, scholars could explore the impact of governmental performance and 
the degree of corruption in post-socialist states. Rose (2001: 105) already hinted at the latter factor, 
which may be an important determinant of the legitimacy of governments and making it likely that 
citizens may decide that ‘the only way to deal with a corrupt state is to beneﬁ t from law-breaking 
oneself’.
This also points at rather complex and diverse moral obligations in post-socialist states (cf. Wanner 
2005). This paper only addressed diﬀ erences in levels of morality in these societies, which appeared 
to be rather modest. However, the variance in morality might be quite high. We see a parallel with 
(post)modernization theory, which does not only predict that individual’s moral views will become 
more lenient, but also that moral views will become more diverse. According to Inglehart (1997), 
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among others, postmodernization implies a growth of an anti-authority sentiment, meaning that 
individuals are increasingly free to choose their own standards of judgement, without any traditional 
authority telling them what is right or wrong. Moral beliefs, convictions and values are assumed to be 
dependent upon personal desires and preferences and are constantly open to debate, reformulation 
and change. This ﬁ rst of all impacts the level of morality, which is what we address in this paper. 
But it may also aﬀ ect the variance in morality, which can be assumed to be larger in more modern/
individualized societies (e.g., Draulans & Halman, 2003) or among the younger generation in post-
socialist states. Future research is, therefore, invited to investigate this issue of diversity in moralities.
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